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RESPONSE TO WEITZ . 
by 
William P. Alslon 
Professor Weitz contends that there are no necessary conditions for lhe 
application of the concept of a human action, though there are a number of dis­
tinct sufficient conditions. l n  arguing for this posilion he reviews a number of 
philosophical discussions in which. he supposes, putative necessary conditions 
are set forlh. He argues, in the case of each, that it is not a necessary condition, 
though he allows that some of them are sufficient conditions. 
In criticizing the necessary-conditjon-claims he has discovered Weitz proceeds 
in  two different ways in two dif(erent sorts of cases. With respect to R. Taylor, 
A. Danto, and A. Goldman, he argues that the putative condition is internally 
unsuitable to serve as a condition, by reason of ambiguity, obscurity, or 
"privacy": so that, in a sense, the problem of whether it really is a necessary 
condition of action never arises. However the candidates put forward by C. 
Taylor, Chisholm, Melden, and (he supposes) Davidson, he finds sufficiently 
intelligible to be worth considerir.g; and he argues, in the case of each of these, 
that it is not in fact a necessary condition. l should like lo focus on his treat· 
menl of the second group. 
Rather than going into the details of his criticisms of these various theorists, 
I feel thal it would be moYe fruitful to concentrate on Weitz's basic strategy of 
criticism; in doing so, we will be led into questions about the nature of the 
problem for which Weitz is considering various solutions. Weit�'s line of 
criticism for the second group is \'ery simple. He maintains that there are clear 
cases of human action that do not satisfy the necessary condition. He is quite 
explicit about tltis procedure. Near the end of his paper, he writes "Instead of 
talking o f  core or strong cases of human action, we must talk of undeniable or 
clear cases. ff we do not. we foreciose on the vast variety of cases which it is the 
philosopher's assigned and accepted task to illuminate . . .  we cannot even begin 
to formulate the criteria of an action unless we have some clear cases before 
us." "Now, if we keep before us as many of the clear, undeniable cases of human 
action as we can, it does look as iC their vast variety does defeat any putatively 
necessary property. What, one must ask, is lbe common denominator of the 
following haphazard list of action, none of which can be repudiated without 
arbitrarily limiting lhe range of use of the concept of human action?" There 
follows a long list of pu la ti vely clear cases. 
Now i f  our task is that of teasing out the criteria that govern the application 
of the term 'human action', then the general methodological principle just 
enunciated is surely unexceptionable. However when it comes to pulling this 
•All future publiC'at1on ril(hts reserved by the author. 
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principle into praclice, I run into difficulties. In the presenL instance I find my­
self disagreeing wilh Professor Weitz on some of lhe "clear cases" he proffers. 
The items on his lis� I find myself most strongly inclined to reject are 'for­
get.ting to clear the iced walk', 'falling in lo\ e', and 'missing the Larget'. How 
shall we resolve this disagreement. IL sounds simple enough. Is or is not railing 
in love something to which the term 'human action' is clearly apj:>licable'? If 
someone tells me that he has fallen in love, is it or is il not clear that what he has 
reporled t.o me counts as an action? My unhesitating inclin:at.ion is t.o say 'no'. 
Professor Weitz appart_}ntly has the opposite inclination. Whal else might we try? 
Well. 1 might use the ''camel's nose in lhe Lent" technique. If falling in love- is an 
action, then so are coming to hale someone, getting fond of t.he Rites of Spring, 
and dri(Ling apart from someone. If forgetting to clear the iced walk is an action, 
then what. about inlerding Lo sweep the porch, remembering lo clea� the walk, 
and failing to notice the one-way street sign? What will Weitz's linguistic 
intuition tell him about these cases'? 
So far it may look as if we have just. another of those noL infrequent <·ases 
in which philosophers deliver conflicting linguistic intuitions. However I believe 
Lhal here the trouble goes deeper. It is nol that the putative cases lt which I 
demurred are sharply rontrasled with other cases, lo which the lerm is clearly 
applicable. On lhe contrary there is something generally fishy about t.he whole 
enterprise of looking for cases Lo which the term 'human action' clearly applies 
in some established sense, where this is :mpposect to determine the range of cases 
philosophers are trying lo elucidale in lheir "theories of action ". In other words, 
it seems to me that. one is barking up the wrong tree when one tries to take the 
applicability of the term 'human action' (in any established sense) ru; a touch­
stone against which lo measure philosophical "theories of aclion''. Let me 
elaborate. 
How do we tell wtat are clear cases of human action? The most straight­
forward lack is lo take each putative case in Lum, and reflect on whether one 
would apply the term, •human action' lo it. Unfortunately, it would seem lhal 
we do not use the teml ' human action', or 'action', as a class predicate often 
enough (or standardly enough) lo set up any definite linguistic dispositions in 
this regard. We simply do nol go around calling things actions, or saying of 
things that they are actions. Even if we take items lhat all philosophers will 
agree on, e.g., opening a door, il still sounds odd to say 'His opening lhal door 
was an action (or was a human action)'. In what sort of conlext might one say 
this? Of course, there are other linguistic contexts wilh respect to which the 
term 'human action' or •action' mighl gel established as a clear term, e•1en if it is 
not standardly used as a predicate in the bald fashion just considered. Th us we 
might refer lo things as actions, or say of them that they are actions of such and 
such a sorl. But it seems that we do not do any of these things sufficiently often 
to set up any firm dispositions Lo apply 'action' as a class term to a range of 
"clear cases". We simply do nol go around saying things like 'The last action you 
performed was reprehtnsible', 'Your action of getting into the car was quite 
neat'. 'That was a fast action', 'Your convening that meeting was sneaky action', 
'You still haven'l performed that action I lold you lo perform'. Stalemenls like 
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this sound, at besl, stilted and unnaLural; at worst, unintelligible. 
On further reflection, l am inclined to think that in its most familiar, com­
fortable, and readily interpretable employments, 'action' is a mass noun, rather 
than a class term. We speak of 'a man or action' (not 'actions'), we say of a film 
that 'there was not much action in it' (not 'not many actions'), what the director 
used to say in the old Hollywood movies albout movies was 'Lights, aclion, 
camera', {not 'Lights, actions, camera'), we say ·J finally got some action' (not 
'some aclions'). And so on. It is presumably because of this that it sounds so odd, 
or worse, Lo ask questions like 'How many actions did you perform in driving to 
work'?', or to respond to the above remark about the film with "Well, how many 
actions did you think there were in it?', or 'II ow many actions docs a (ilm have 
lo contain to be satisfactory?' 'Action' simply does not seem to have any 
established, clearly demarcated use as a class lerm.l There are, indeed, contexts 
in which we use the noun in the plural. Thus we say of a man that he is not 
responsible for his actions, and it is said that actions speak louder than words. 
But even here, it would seem that no workable principle of individuation is 
associated with the word. We would not be prepared to go from the above 
statements to an enumeration of the actions for which he is not to be held 
responsible, or to a specification of Lhe number of actions thal spoke louder 
than words in a given instance. I:ven here we are plagued by Lhe lack of any 
established pattern for referring to a given action as an action. and for calling 
something or other an action. 
It is to be noted that 'action' contrasts sharply with 'act' in these respects. \Ve 
do freely refer to so-and-so's as acts (of such and such a kind) and we do say of a 
gh·en so-and-so that it is an act (of such and such a kind). Thus 1 might call 
something you did 'an act of kindness'. 'an act of mercy', or 'an act of superer­
ogation' (not an 'action of kindness'). Again there are acts of will, but no actions 
of will. Philosophers renect these distinctions in ordinary usage when they speak 
of 'mental acts' rather than 'mental actions'. It would seem that 'action' 
occupies something of a middle ground between 'act' and 'behavior'. the 
latter of which is even more unqualifiedly a mass noun than action, though 
psychologists have bravely attempted lo convert it too into a class noun (with 
much less support from ordinary language), with their talk of, e.g., the "various 
behaviors involved i n  anger". I think that a philosopher of Austinian pro­
clivities might do som<' useful work i n  tracing out the contrasts in the estab­
lished uses of these terms. 
These considerations seem to me lo show that there is no established use of 
'action' or 'human action', as a class term, which could serve as a basis for 
resolving questions as to what counts as clear case of a human action. ln 
becoming fluent speakers of the language we simply do not pick up any distinc­
tive dispositions lo apply the term to certain kinds or events (or whatevers) 
rather than other kinds; and so we never develop the sorls o f  linguistic dis· 
positions, reflection on which might yield a set of clear cases. As a result, the 
term is highly subject to lhe theoretical predilections of whatever philosopher 
happens to be discussing the subject. Given that this term has become current 
as the preferred category term for the range of things discus.5ed in "the philos-
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ophy of action", a given philosopher will find t.hat certain controversial items are 
or are not cases of action, depending on his further philosophical co1r.mitments. 
The lack of any firm pattern of application in ordinary language leaves a vacuum 
which his philosophical commitments are all too ready to fill. 'rhis is my ex­
planation of the persistent disputes over \arious kinds of controversial cases or 
action, and this is why I feel that the problems of the philosophy of action are 
nol properly approached by asking about the extension or intension of 'action' 
of 'human action'. A "philosophy of action" that proceeds in this fashion is 
built on sand. 
There are also less radkal objections to supposing the philosophical problem 
of the nature of "action" Lo be concerned with the criteria of applica�ion of the 
term 'action' (in some established sense ) ;  and these would be well worth ex­
ploring at some length, were the more radical objections not. more decisive. For 
one thing the ordinary term is much more restrictive in its range or a;>plication; 
it is used to mark much more specific contrasts than the concept which the 
philosophical theory of adion seeks lo explicate. For example. 'aclion' is often 
used in contrast with thinking and talking. A man of action is one who doesn't 
just sit around thinking things over and carrying on endless discussion: he goes 
out and does tilings. Similarly it would be no criticism of my judgment that 
there wasn'L much action in the film, lo point out that there was a great deal 
of conversation in it. For the philosopher on the other hand, speech (and per­
haps thinking as well} certainly figures among the things he wants his ''theory of 
action'' to cover.2 fn the second place, the term does not always stand in the 
same conlrasts; its criteria of application will vary in different contexts. Thus 
although, as in the above cases, action is sometimes contrasted with speech, in 
other contexts il will include speech. If I am not responsible for his ac�ions. then 
I suppose this implies that l am not responsible for whal he says, as well as not 
responsible for his non-verbal beha\ ior. Third, the term extE'nds out.side the 
usual philosophical area of concern, even when applied to human affairs. For 
example the action that a certain photographer recently brought against Jackie 
Onassis, would not be taken by most "act.ion theorists" as an example of the 
sort of thing or which they are trying to construct a theory. Thus, even if all the 
other obje<'lions could be overcome. we would still ha\•e Lo specif) the sense of 
'action' in which it could be claimed lhat the philosopher is looking for the 
criteria of application of that term. 
ii 
If we can't pinpoint what the philosopher of action is after by saying that. he 
is trying Lo determine the criteria of application of 'action', in some established 
sense, how can we do so? As may be surmised from what l have said so far. l 
believe the situation to be much too complex and chaotic to permit any answer 
of this degree of simplicity. With this caveat l may briefly explain how 1 con­
ceive the philosophicaJ problem of "lhe nature or act.ion". We start wilh a dimly 
descried distinction between action and passion, between the things a person 
does and I.he things that happen lo him, (and when it  is the person (as a whole) 
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that does it ralher than some part or his body). Items in the former category 
seem to give rise to a number of philosophical problems. (Just to mention one of 
these problems, when I lhink of an e\•enl as a person doing something, this seems 
to carry with it the notion or the person as agent, as somehow responsible fol' 
the production of some change in a way different from thal in which a set of 
events and/or causal conditions are responsible for their effecls. Agents seem to 
constitute indissoluble knots in the otherwise smooth flow of causality.) Of 
course it is not as if the ordinary term 'do' (or the active voice of the verb} 
adequately locales the range of cases with which the philosophy of action is 
concerned, any more than the Ol'dinary term 'action' does. ("Taking a nap") is 
one of the things J could, in good conscience, say that I had been doing today, 
but most philosophers would not want to count that as one of the things lo 
which they would want their account of the nature of "action" to apply.) How­
ever if we say that what we are concerned with is the distinctive character of 
what men do (as opposed to what happens to them), this is, i t  seems to me, a 
better starting point in ordinary language than 'action', if for no other reason 
than because it is not subject to the crippling disabilities that affect 'action' by 
reason of its being primarily a mass noun. We can then try to pin down the range 
of the concept more precisely by various qualifications (involving bodily move­
ment. doable at will, being the sorL o f  thing for which one might give reasons, 
etc.); and not all investigators will introduce tine same further specifications. 
Why is this? Or, better, wllat is the source of these differences'? What leads one 
philosopher to delimit his sphere of inquiry by one qualification, and another 
philosopher by another? l l  is this question we must answer (correctly), if we are 
to achieve a penetrating understanding of the subject matter of the philosophy 
of action. 
The correct answer seems lo me to be that what guides the selectivity is the 
philosophical problem (or range of philosophical problems) with which the 
philosopher in question is most concerned. We have already alluded to the fact 
that "what men do" is of interest t.o philosophers. because in attempting to 
understand men's doings, and the relations of these doings to a variety of things, 
one is led into a number of puzzling and challenging questions. These include: 
1. The nature of agency. (E.g., can the attribution of certain happenings t.o 
an agent as the "doer" of them be analy:t.ed in terms of their causation by 
certain kinds of events; and if not, how is the operation of an agent to be 
conceived?) (R. Taylor, R. Chisholm) 
2. What differentiates the ·'voluntary movements" of an organism from its 
other movements? Is it by the sort of internal processes from which they 
issue or otherwise? 
3. The nature and operation of deliberation, "praclical knowledge", ncLing 
for a reason, and reason-giving. (C.E.M. Anscombe) 
4.  The structure of Leleological (purposive) explanation, and the requirements 
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of ils applicability. 
5. \\'hat il is for a man to be responsible for somethin� he does'? Under what 
condition� is he so responsible'? ( l l .L.A. Harl) 
Clearly, if one is primarily concerned to e�plore problems in one or another of 
lhese tluslers, he will seek to separate oul a class or "doin�s'' to which his 
particular bag of problems apply. Thus the man prirnaril) mterl'sled 11: ( 1 )  will 
want his class lo include all (and presumabl� on I)) those fact<> that (he takes to) 
imoke an allribulion lo an agent, a "t'enler of agenc} ". A (2) thcori<\t ,.,ill focus 
on the class of "voluntar) movements": our ( 3) man on the class of doirgs about 
which a pet1;on might deliberate and/or for which it is appropriate to ask for a 
certain kind o r  reason or explanation; ( t )  will be concerned with Lhe class of 
things done for some purpose, and (5) wilh Lhose doings fol' which a man is, 
could be, or might conceivably be, held responsible. O f  course, the applicalion 
of some of these criteria is not crystal clear and, in a number of ('ascs, highly 
controversial. But even allowing for a cerlain amount of indl'lcrminacy. il is. 
nevertheless, abundantly clear that the <'lasses so determined will not e�actly 
coincide. For example, ( 2 )  will exclude, while presumabl)- all lh<> others will 
include, (deliberate) abc;lentions lhal "lnrnlw" no bodil) movemt>nts ( 1 )  will 
presumably extend more widely than ( l ), since there art> presumabl)' many 
idle doings, e.g., idl) doodliing, pursing one's lips, or drumming on the h:ule, that 
are ascribed lo oneself as agent. yet ai-C' not done for any purpose. (5) will be 
wider or narrower, depending on lhe exact form it  takes, hut presumably it will 
be lhe narrowest class of all, since lhere seem to be doings for which .he ques· 
lion of the agent's responsibility could nol pos.-;ibl� arise. 'rhus the different 
lheorisls will presumably be addressjng thcmseh-ei. to differt.>nt ranges of cases. 
And those among therr who go along with philosophical fashion to U·e extent 
of supposing that 'action' must be the right (•ategor) term for the1 · subject 
matter. will presumabl) find it natural to suppose lhal their favored criLeria 
demarcate the limits of application of this lerm; the) ma) well be led into 
searching for ways of showing that lhe ordinary use of 'aclion' is governed by 
such condilions: the) may even compound the confusion b> at<·using their 
colleagues of distorting, misusing. or misrepresenting the orclinar) concept of 
human atlion. Thus Richard Taylor (1 )  will prolesl., against 11.L.A.Harl (5)  
lhat it is  obvious that lhere are aclio11s (doings that arc clear cast's of actions) 
for which il would make no sense lo hold the agent responsible: and Miss 
Anscombc will lodge a 5imilar complaint againsL (2) lo the effect lhat there are 
certainly actions that do not involve bodily movement (e.g., refraining from 
answering a jibe).3 
Once we appreciate t.he points just made, we will see thal /hrsr controversies 
are a tempest in a teapot. We will lose lhe inclination to try lo decide whether 
the class of actions is really demarcated by the boundaries sketched by one of 
the lwo Taylors, Harl or Goldman. \\e will see lhal ''theories of aclion ' are nol 
usefully construed as addressing themsehcs lo any such question. and hence we 
will be relie,ed or the necessity of deciding which of them. if  an) . has answered 
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it aright. More specifically, once we realize that (a) neither the word 'action' nor 
any other word, phrase, or construction bas a standard use such that philoso· 
phers who discuss the nalure of action could fru itfully be construed as attempt­
ing lo describe that standard use, and thal (b) differences over both lhe exten­
sion and intension of lhe class of "actions" can be traced to differences in the 
philosophical problems on which a given philosopher is concentraling, we will 
see the enormity or the mistake involved in supposing that differences among 
philosophers as to what counts as an action (and as to what it takes for some­
thing lo count as an action) are incompatible statements about the nature of 
some independently specifiable subject matter. Once we appreciate these points 
we will realize that the subject matter o f  the "philosophy of action" is not 
prefigured, pre-ordained, or predetermined by the ordinary use of 'action', or 
of any other term. Since the various action theorists are not disagreeing about 
the nature, character, crileria for, or extension of, some antecedently fixed 
�ubject-matter, called "action", we are not called upon to decide which of 
them, if any. is right. (This, of course, is not to say that they may not disagree 
about a number of other things.) Since each is concerned to discern the linea­
ments of some class of doings with respect to which certain philosophical 
puzzles arise (and then, of course, go on to grapple with the puzzles), they 
are not. really competing with each other when each lays out his favored con· 
cept and associated class. We may accept (or reject) each of the classes so 
delineated as one about which interesting and important problems arise; we can 
view each class as one delermined by the problem in question. (No demarcation 
with problematicity.) We don't have lo clloose between them. Let a thousand 
flowers blossom. 
iii 
Enough of meta-philosophy! Unfortunalely (or fortunately. as the case may 
be) I would seem lo have left myself little lime for the real thing. A few brief 
comments will have to suffice. 
It will be apparent from remarks made al the beginning of this paper thal I 
do not feel that Weitz' list of "clear cases" indicates any philosophically 
interesting concept, or. indeed, ary homogeneous concept with distinct linea­
ments. And if this is the case, it is hardly surprising that Weitz can make a case 
for the proposition that there are no (interesting or readily discernible} necessary 
conditions for the application of the concept so specified , and still less sur­
prising that conditions put forward by various theorists as necessary for the 
concepl of adion, should not be necessary for the application o f  Wcilz's con­
cept.4 However even if my strictures on the Weitz-concept are justified, Weitz's 
claims concerning this concept will sti II be too extreme. It will nol be lhe case 
that there are no necessary conditions for its application, even i f  we put to one 
side trivial conditions (of the order of 'satisfying the same concept as each of the 
items on list L'). If [ have any grasp at all of the concept Weitz has in mind (as 
indicated by the items on his list), I would suppose LhaL one necessary condition 
for something's falling under this concept is that il be an event (or "occurrence", 
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if you prerer) involving a human being. This condition is by no means trivial; 
and it rules out many, many sorts of things as not falling under the roncepL. If 
Weitz admits that Lhis is indeed a necessary condition, he might go on Lo say that 
it is not a very interesting or dislin<:live necessary condition, that it does not 
bring out what is distinctive of action, that it is not the sort. or lhing philoso· 
phers have been looking for when they looked for necessary conditions for 
somelhing's being a human acLion. And he might.. well be justified in these 
contentions. However in  lhal case he will not be able lo state his thesis in so 
simple a fashion; il will become, ralher, the thesis Lhat the concept of human 
action is governed by no necessary conditions that : and he will 
be faced with the task of filling in Lhat blank and justifying the thesis as so 
qualified. 
Finally D should like Lo say a few words about Weitz's contention that lhe 
various theorists he surveys, or some of them, do succeed in providing surfici(>nt 
conditions for the appliCll!tion of the term 'hu1nan action'. In opposition to this, 
I maintain that, if we consider any interesting demarcation of the class of human 
actions, or ev�n i f  we consider Weilz's putative concept of a human action, none 
of the candidates he mentions are sufficient conditions in any interesting way. 
Each of them either fails lo be a sufficient condition, or else i l  succeeds by dint 
of explicitly conlaining lhe concept for which il is supposed Lo be a sufficient 
condition. 
Weilz tells us that his main thesis in his paper was first suggesled to him by 
John Austin's essay, '·A Plea for Excuses"; and he claims that in that essay 
Austin put forward cerlain sufficient conditions for something's being an action, 
viz., "justification, praise, blame, intention, purpose, responsibility, among 
others". Weitz is not very explicit as to just how the putative sufficient con­
ditions arc <'Onstituted, bul the suggestion I get from his exposition is that 
(1) somethi11g's being praised (or is it praiscablo or praiseworthy?) is a sufficient 
condition f'or its being an action, (2) something's being justified ls sufficirnt. for 
its being an action, and so on.5 Now as so slated this is false. Clearly I can 
praise things olher lhau ..,clions. I can, e.g., praise a work of art; l can praise a 
person (and 1 can praise him for his qualities and abilities rather than for any 
specific aclions). Likewise 1 can justify proposals, principles, and sLandards, a.' 
well as actions. I f  these formulations are lo escape being blalanlly inadequate 
they will have lo be further enriched so as lo specify, e.g . .  nol jusl being 
praised or capable of being praised, but, more speci fically. being praised or 
praiseable in a way that is dislinclive of actions; and to escape triviali�y lhis 
will have Lo be done without explicitly emp loying lhe term 'action' or any 
synonym. Whether or nol this can be done, Weit:c: has nol done it, nor has he 
given any indication of how it can be done. l l  1s noteworthy that his mosl ex­
plicit slatemenl of a necessary condition, in the section on Austin is the 
following. "Nevertheless, a good reason for something being an action or being 
called an action is that tl•e specified action-when untoward-is open to excuse 
o( juslifiralion.'' (italics added). Well. of course. if  o specified action is open to 
excuse or lo JUSlification. that is sufficient for its being an aclion ! But that is 
hardly illuminating; e\len if the specified action were not open to excuse or 
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justification it would still be an action. Being a (specified} action is by itself 
sufficient for someLhing's being an action! 
The other supposed sufficient conditions are subject to similar slrictures, 
though the details will differ from case t.o case. In the summary list on page 28, 
we find, for inst.ance, "agent-cau:;ed" and "governed by conventions". But 
clearly things other than actions are "agent-caused"; e.g., when 1 shut a door, 
lhe door's being shut is agent-caused; whenever an agent brings about effects in 
the "external world" these effects are correctly described as "agent-caused". 
Again, not only actions are "governed by conventions"; the size and shape of a 
football field and the duties of a host are likewise governed by convention. 
Again, to transform these into workable sufficient conditions, we will have to 
make explicit. lhc distinctive way in which actions and only actions are "agent­
caused", and the way in which actions and only actions are "governed by 
conventions". And again, the trick is to do I.his without explicitly employing 
the concept of an action. 
FOOTNOTF.S 
lTbc same lhini: seems lo be lrue of our Lalk of inanimate action. We spt>ak o f  thl' act.ion of 
corrosive agents cm metal (not actions). and Lhe acllon of the waves on the clifrs. 
2This. of cour.,c. is a pervasive pbeno:11enon. Typically lhc philosopher subjects some 
<>rdinary langua)!c term to consid<,rable stretching in order lo convert it mlo a broad 
category term. ·cause', •mental'. and •moral' arc cases in point. 
3N ol all philosoph<•rs who arc engaged in cxplonn1: problems included on the above list 
preface their explorations with claims to be demarcating the class of "actions" in general, 
Some of them use more specific terms £or the object of their reflections, C.R., 'intentional 
action', 'purpoo;iv<' action', or 'voluntar)' movoment•. Where this is so, they do not even 
seem to be presenting competing analyses or, or criteria for. the same concept. 
4tn this connection the following point >hould uc noted. Whenever one dcf<'ats a series of 
necessary condition claims (Cor a given term) bv indicating. for each put..itivc necessary 
condition, something to which I.he term appJies but which docs not satisfy lhal condition, 
the hypothesis of multivocality should !>\' C"l\ecked out before co11cluding that we are con· 
fronted with o conct>pt that lacks ne.:essary conditions. Otherwise our conelus1on is 
bought at too cheap a pric<'. I C  I neglect.Cd Lhe multivocality possibility, iL would be easy 
for me to prove th.lt Lhere are no necessary conditions of applkalion for lhc concept of a 
sound. li someone chums that being audible is a necessary condition. I cite Long !�land 
Sound. If, per contra, beini: a body of water is cited as a necessary condition, I cite the 
sound I Just heard coming from m y  back vard. Surely things can't be this easy. Thus, 
waiving au the other difficulLics already m<>ntioned, we must still require of Weil/ that 
he give reason fot supposing thaL the failure of a certain putative necessary condition is due 
to the fact thal we arc confronted with a conrcpt that lacks any ncccssarv conditions raLhcr 
than due lo the pan that. our term expresses several different concepts each of whicll may 
well have necessary conditions. 
5with the others it is not so clear how to formulate the sufficient condition. Just what son 
of relation to intention OI' purpose is suificient for something's being an aclion'! ls it that 
the something must embody purpose or int.enlion? Result from or stem from intention? 
Or what? 
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